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Abstract 
  
We present a novel methodology for identifying public knowledge and eliminating the 
biases it creates when aggregating information in small group settings.  A two-stage 
mechanism consisting of an information market and a coordination game is used to 
reveal and adjust for individuals public information.  A nonlinear aggregation of their 
decisions then allows for the calculation of the probability of the future outcome of 
an uncertain event, which can then be compared to both the objective probability of 
its occurrence and the performance of the market as a whole.  Experiments show 
that this nonlinear aggregation mechanism outperforms both the imperfect market 
and the best of the participants.  
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Introduction 
The prediction of the future outcomes of uncertain situations is an important problem 
for individuals and organizations.  As a result, large resources are devoted to 
producing reliable forecasts of technology trends, revenues, growth, and other 
valuable insights.  To complicate matters, in the case of organizations the 
information relevant to predictions is often dispersed across people, making it hard 
to identify and aggregate it.  Thus, while several methods are presently used in 
forecasting, ranging from committees and expert consultants to aggregation 
techniques such as the Delphi method [1], the results obtained suffer in terms of 
accuracy and ease of implementation.   
In this paper, we propose and experimentally verify a market-based method to 
aggregate scattered information so as to produce reliable forecasts of uncertain 
events.  This method is based on the belief shared by most economists that markets 
efficiently collect and disseminate information [2].  In particular, rational 
expectations theory tells us that markets have the capacity not only to aggregate 
information held by individuals, but also to convey it via the price and volume of 
assets associated with that information.  Therefore, a possible methodology for the 
prediction of future outcomes is the construction of markets where the asset is 
information rather than a physical good.  Laboratory experiments have determined 
that these markets do indeed have the capacity to aggregate information in this type 
of setting [3, 4, 5, 6].  
Information markets generally involve the trading of state-contingent securities.  If 
these markets are large enough and properly designed, they can be more accurate 
than other techniques for extracting diffuse information, such as surveys and 
opinions polls.  There are problems however, with information markets, as they tend 
to suffer from information traps [7, 8], illiquidity [9], manipulation [10, 11], and lack 
of equilibrium [12, 13]1.  These problems are exacerbated when the groups involved 
                                                 
1 Notable exceptions:  The Iowa Electronic Market [14] has shown that political events can be accurately 
predicted using markets when they are large enough.  Their predictions have consistently been more 
accurate than those resulting from major news polls.  Additionally, recent work by Pennock, Lawrence, 
Giles and Nielsen [15] show that the Hollywood Stock Exchange (HSX) does a remarkable job of predicting 
box office revenues and Oscar winners.  However, both of these institutions have many traders, while we 
focus on systems with small number of participants (fewer than 15). 
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are small and not very experienced at playing in these markets.  Even when 
possible, proper market design is very expensive, fragile, and context-specific. 
In spite of these obstacles, it is worth noting that certain participants in information 
markets can have either superior knowledge of the information being sought, or are 
better processors of the knowledge harnessed by the information market itself.  By 
keeping track of the profits and final holdings of the members, one can determine 
which participants have these talents, along with their risk attitudes. 
In earlier work, (Chen, Fine, and Huberman [16]), we demonstrated the comparative 
efficacy of a nonlinear aggregation mechanism with behavioral components to that of 
a market.  Specifically, we showed that one could take past predictive performance 
of participants in information markets and to create weighting schemes that help 
predict future events, even if they are not the same event on which the performance 
was measured.  Furthermore, our two-stage approach successfully harnessed 
distributed knowledge in a manner that alleviated the problems that arise from low 
levels of participation. 
However, these results were not robust to the presence of public information, that is, 
information that is commonly known to multiple individuals in the group.  This is 
because public information is bound to introduce strong correlations in the 
knowledge possessed by members of the group, correlations that were not explicitly 
taken into account by our aggregation algorithm. 
Nevertheless, the success of our two-stage forecasting mechanism with private 
information led us to search for suitable modifications that would allow the detection 
of the amount of public information present in a group so as to subtract it.  Assuming 
that subjects can differentiate between the public and private information they hold, 
that the private aspect of their information is truly private (held only by one 
individual), and that the public information is truly public (held by at least two 
individuals), we create a coordination variant of the mechanism which allows for the 
identification of public information within a group and its subtraction when 
aggregating individual predictions about uncertain outcomes.  Experiments in the 
laboratory show that this aggregation mechanism outperforms both the market and 
the best player in the group.  
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In what follows, we first outline the original two-stage mechanism for information 
aggregation and then explain the modified second stage that allows for public 
information to be extracted.  Next, we present laboratory experiments that 
quantitatively measure the performance of this new mechanism and established its 
superiority with respect to both the information market and the participating 
members.  An appendix provides the mathematical details of the coordination game. 
  
Extracting Private Information  
We start by reviewing the original nonlinear aggregation scheme, presented in Chen, 
Fine and Huberman [16].  This aggregation scheme applies to a group of individuals 
that hold private information. 
In the first stage of this mechanism, individuals participate in an information market 
designed to elicit their risk attitudes and other relevant behavioral information.  As 
was shown, although the participant pool is too small for the market to act perfectly 
efficiently, it nevertheless provides accurate behavioral information.  In the second 
stage, individuals are asked to report their beliefs and these beliefs and are in turn 
aggregated in a nonlinear fashion that takes into account the behavioral information 
gathered in the first stage.  The two stages are applied to different events that are 
nevertheless structurally similar. 
In the second stage, each player is asked to report a vector of perceived state-
probabilities, {p1,p2,…pN} , with pi the probability that a given state i will be realized, 
and with the constraint that the vector sums to one.  When the true state x is 
revealed, each player is paid an amount equal to c1+c2*log(px), where c1 and c2 are 
positive numbers.  This payoff function ensures that risk-neutral expected utility 
maximizers would report their true beliefs.  So, each player should report his 
perceived probability distribution over the N possible states. 
In order to compute the probability distribution, we aggregate the individual reports 
by using the following nonlinear aggregation function, which is a modification of 
Bayes rule: 
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where s is a given possible state, I is the available information, and βi is the 
exponent assigned to individual i.  The role of βi is to help recover the true posterior 
probabilities from individual is report.  The value of β for a risk neutral individual is 
one, as he should report the true probabilities coming out of his information.  For a 
risk averse individual, βi is greater than one so as to compensate for the flat 
distribution that he reports.  The reverse, namely βi smaller than one, applies to risk 
loving individuals.  In terms of both the market performance and the individual 
holdings and risk behavior, βi is given by  
βi=r(V i /σi)c (3) 
where r is a parameter that captures the risk attitude of the whole market and is 
reflected in the market prices of the assets, Vi is the utility of individual i, and βi is 
the variance of his holdings over time.  We use c as a normalization factor so that if 
r=1, ∑βi equals the number of players.  
  
Identifying Public Information 
Although this mechanism works well with private independent information (see 
Tables 1 and 2, Experiments 1 through 5), its performance can be significantly 
degraded by the introduction of public information.  The introduction of public 
information implies that the probabilities that enter into Equation (2) are no longer 
independent of each other, and therefore they are no longer aggregated correctly. 
Equation (2) over counts information that is observed by more than one individual 
since it adds  (in the probability space) probabilities disregarding whether the reports 
are coming from the same information source. 
Thus the mechanism has to incorporate a feature that distinguishes the public 
information from the private, so that it can be suitably subtracted when aggregating 
the individual predictions.  We achieve this by using in the second stage a 
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coordination game, which incents players to reveal what they believe others will 
reveal.  This coordination game is similar to the Battle of the Sexes game. 
In the Battle of the Sexes, a couple enjoys spending time together, but each 
member would rather do so while engaged in his or her preferred activity.  As an 
example, a payoff matrix is shown for an instance in which hed like them both to go 
to the baseball game (upper-left), and shed prefer they went to the opera together 
(lower-right).  If they disagree, no one goes anywhere and no one is happy (off-
diagonals).  
  SHE 
  B O 
B 3,1 0,0 
HE 
O 0,0 1,3 
This game has multiple mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, in which both players mix 
with the goal of landing in the upper-left and lower-right quadrants of the payoff 
matrix.  Notice that with these payoffs each member of the couple is incented to 
reveal the information that they believe the other will. 
In much the same way, our matching game asks players that, in addition to making 
their best bet (MYBB), they reveal what they believe they all know (AK).  The first 
half, MYBB, works as in the original experiments.  That is, players report a vector of 
bets on the possible states, and are paid according to a log function of these bets.  
In the AK game however, the subjects try to guess the bets placed by someone else 
in the room, and these bets are then matched to another player whose bets are most 
similar to theirs.  The payout from this part of the game is a function of both their 
matching level and the possible payout from the number of tickets allocated by the 
other member of the pair.  The payoffs are constructed such that participants have 
the incentive to match their peers in their public reports.  The design of this game is 
discussed further in the Experimental Design section. 
In order to design a payoff function that induces both truthful revelation and 
maximal matching, we assume that: (A1) the public and private information held by 
an individual are independent of one another, (A2) that private information is 
independent across individuals, (A3) that public information is truly public (observed 
by more than one individual), and (A4) that an given individual can distinguish 
between the public and the private information he holds. In other words: 
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For each individual i with observed information Oi, there exists information Oi
priv and 
Oi
pub such that: 
(A1) P(s| Oi) = P(s| Oi
priv) P(s| Oi
pub) for all i,s 
(A2) P(s| Oi
priv and Ojpriv) = P(s| Oi
priv) P(s| Ojpriv) for all i,j,s 
(A3) There exists a j for every i such that Oi
pub = Ojpub 
(A4) All individuals know P(s| Oi
priv) and P(s| Oi
pub) 
So, in the second stage, each player i is asked to report two probability distributions, 
ip
r
={pi1,pi2,…piN} (from MYBB) and iq
r
={qi1,qi2,…qiN} (from AK), by allocating a set 
of tickets to each of the possible states.  Let x be the true outcome.  The payoff 
function for each player i is given by the following expression: 
 
P=c1+c2*log(pix)+f( iq
r
, jq
r
)*(c4+c5*log(qjx))
 
 
(4) 
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In words, subjects are paid according to a log function of their reports in the MYBB 
game, plus a payment from the AK game.  This payment is a function of the player 
with whom he has a maximal match, and is the product of the matching level and a 
scaled log function of the matched players report in the AK game.  This match level 
is given by the second term of Equation (4) and is detailed in Equation (5) above. 
As shown earlier (Chen, Fine and Huberman [16]), the first part of the payoff 
function in Equation (4), c1+c2*log(pix), will induce risk neutral subjects who 
maximize their expected utility to report their true belief, conditioned on both their 
private and public information.  Concerning the last term of Equation (4), we first 
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note that player i can only affect it through his matching level, which is given by the 
function f( iq
r
, jq
r
).  Since )x,y(f)x,x(f rrrr ≥ for all yr , player i’s best response is to 
report iq
r
= jq
r
.  Further, since j is chosen such that f( iq
r
, jq
r
)≥ f( iq
r
, kq
r
) for all k, 
player i only needs to co-ordinate his iq
r
with only one other individual in the group to 
achieve an optimal payoff.  Additionally, it is easy to show that this part of the game 
has multiple Nash equilibria, since any common report vector qr reported by both 
players i and j is a potential Nash equilibrium.  Therefore, we designed the payoff 
function given by in Equations (4) and (5) to encourage individuals to coordinate on 
the probability distribution induced by the public information.  Lastly, the third piece 
of the payoff function for player i, c4+c5*log(qjx) induces a different payoff for each 
Nash equilibrium qr  on which the two individuals coordinate.  Since this factor 
depends on the strategy of player is partner j, no one player can directly affect it.  
This is crucial to preserve the equilibrium structure.  
We thus designed the payoff such that the more information revealed in the reports 
qr , the higher the potential payoff to the subjects involved, which implies an 
information-rich equilibrium.  Additionally, since private information is independent 
across individuals (it is truly private), the best equilibrium on which individuals can 
coordinate on is the probability distribution induced by using the public information 
only.  Therefore, this mechanism will induce individuals to report both their true 
beliefs ( ip
r
) and their public information ( iq
r
).  Once these vectors are reported, we 
still need to aggregate them, which we discuss in the next section.  
 
Aggregating Information 
Once we have a mechanism for extracting public beliefs from private ones, it is 
straightforward to add a public information generalization to Equation (2).  By 
dividing the perceived probability distributions of the players by the distributions 
induced by the public information only, we develop what we call a General Public 
Information Mechanism (GPIC), which is given by   
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(6) 
 
where the qs are extracted from individuals reports  before they are aggregated. 
This correction allows us to isolate the private information from the individual 
reports. 
While this mechanism is quite general, and outperforms both the market prediction 
and that of our original IAM, there are potential improvements to it that can be 
implemented.  Thus, we developed modifications to the aggregation function to 
address issues of uncertain information structures and multiple equilibria.  In theory, 
knowledge of the individuals reports ip
r
={pi1,pi2,…piN} and iq
r
={qi1,qi2,…qiN}, should 
make information aggregation straightforward since for a given individual i, his 
probability assignment to state s, with respect to private information,  should be 
proportional to psi/qsi.  To more efficiently add in public information, we aggregate 
the individual reports of public information iq
r
={qi1,qi2,qiN} into a single vector 
qr ={q1,q2,qN}.  In order to do this, we employ one additional assumption, that 
every individual observes the same public information, Opub.  We then aggregate by 
averaging the reports, weighted by each individuals β , thusly: 
qs= ∑∑
==
ββ
N
1i
i
N
1i
siiq  
 
(7) 
Once we have completed this aggregation process, we can use the new vector qr  in 
place of iq
r
in the original function in Equation (6).  If qr  is derived correctly, it will 
resolve the matter of parsing the private information from the public.  Furthermore, 
in much the same way that some people process their private signals better than 
others, there are some individuals that report public information more accurately 
than others.  If one can identify these individuals, one can recover public information 
more efficiently than by taking a weighted average of everyones report.  Thus, 
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instead of using the whole group to recover public information, as in Equation (7), 
we use a limited set J, a subset of the whole group: 
qs= ∑∑
=∈
ββ
N
1i
i
Ji
siiq  
 
(7a) 
 
The resultant forecast is then determined by a modification of the GPIC in Equation 
(6).  It uses a small subset of players to determine the public information so as to 
parse it from the private.  While this mechanism is quite efficient, it only applies to 
the special case where the public information is completely public and identical.  
Therefore, we refer to it as the Special Public Information Correction Mechanism, or 
SPIC.  
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Experimental Design 
In order to test this mechanism we conducted a number of experiments at Hewlett-
Packard Laboratories in Palo Alto, California.  The subjects were undergraduate and 
graduate students at Stanford University and knew the experimental parameters 
discussed below, as they were part of the instructions and training for the sessions.  
The five sessions were run with nine to eleven subjects in each. 
We implemented the two-stage mechanism in a laboratory setting.  Possible 
outcomes were referred to as states in the experiments.  There were ten possible 
states, A through J, in all the experiments.  Each had an Arrow-Debreu state security 
associated with it.  The information available to the subjects consisted of observed 
sets of random draws from an urn with replacement.  After privately drawing the 
state for the ensuing period, we filled the urn with one ball for each state, plus an 
additional two balls for the true state security.  Thus it is slightly more likely to 
observe a ball for the true state than others.  
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We allowed subjects to observe different number of draws from the urn in order to 
controlled the amount of information given to the subjects.  We used four variants on 
the of information structure to ensure that the results obtained were robust.  In the 
first structure, we provide two private and two public draws to all participants.  In 
the remaining, all subjects received three private draws.  In one, they also received 
one public draw, in another, only half of the cohort received the public draw, and in 
the final treatment all players received a public draw, but there were two different 
public draws available.  Further details of the treatments can be found in Table 1. 
The information market we constructed consists of an artificial call market in which 
the securities are traded.  The states are equally likely and randomly drawn.  If a 
state occurred, the associated state security paid off at a value of 1,000 francs.  
Hence, the expected value of any given security, a priori, is 100 francs.  Subjects 
were provided with some securities and francs at the beginning of each period. 
Each period consisted of six rounds, lasting 90 seconds each.  At the end of each 
round, the bids and asks were gathered and a market price and volume was 
determined.  The transactions were then completed and another call round began.  
At the end of six trading rounds the period was over, the true state security was 
revealed, and subjects were paid according to the holdings of that security.  This 
procedure was then repeated in the next period, with no correlation between the 
states drawn in each period. 
In the second-stage, every subject played under the same information structure as 
in the first stage, although the draws and the true states were independent from 
those in the first.  There are two parts to this game, described in the Identifying 
Public Information section above, which were referred to as the "What Do We All 
Know" (AK) and the "Make Your Best Bet" (MYBB) games.  Each period, the subjects 
received their draws of information, as in the market game.  They also received two 
sets of 100 tickets each, one set for AK, and one for MYBB.  We will discuss these 
two games in turn. 
In MYBB, the subjects were asked to distribute their tickets across the ten states 
with the constraint that all 100 tickets must be spent each period and that at least 
one ticket is spent on each state.  Since the fraction of tickets spent determines psi, 
this implies that psi is never zero.  The subjects were given a chart that told them 
Page 12 
how many francs they would earn upon the realization of the true state as a function 
of the number of tickets spent on the true state security.  The payoff was a linear 
function of the log of the percentage of tickets placed in the winning state as given 
by the first half of Equation (4).  The chart the subjects received showed the payoff 
for every possible ticket expenditure, and an excerpt from the chart is shown in 
Table 3.  The MYBB game is identical to the second stage played in Chen, Fine and 
Huberman [16].  
We also played the matching game in this stage, known as AK.  In this stage, 
subjects received 100 tickets, but with a different goal.  They tried to guess the bets 
placed by someone else in the room.  After they placed the bets, they were matched 
to another player, one whose bets were most similar to theirs.  The more similar the 
bets were to their nearest match, the higher the reported "Percent Match with 
Partner."  The payoffs for any given ticket expenditure were higher in the AK game 
than the MYBB game, and are detailed in Table 3.  
Figure 1 shows a screenshot from the second stage of the game, which displays the 
bets placed in a sample Period 1.  As shown on the upper right, the true state was F.  
Following down the items reported in the upper right of the screen, we see that this 
player bet 20 tickets on F in the MYBB game, which has corresponds to a Possible 
Payout of 662 francs.  He was matched with a partner whose AK distribution of 
tickets matched his at a 49% level.  This partner bet enough tickets to have a 
Possible Payout of 178 francs.  Our sample player thus earned 662 francs for the 20 
tickets bet in the MYBB game, plus .49*178 = 87 francs for the AK game, for a total 
of 749 francs.  
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Figure 1: Sample Page from Stage Two of the Experiment 
Possible 
States:  A  To  J  Period        1  
Drawing from a urn with replacement containing:  State        F  
3  balls for the true state  Total  Tickets on this State    20 
1  ball for each false state  Payoff  Percent Match with Partner  49  
|||  Private Information  749 Maximal Payoff from Partner 178  
>>>  Public Information     Payoff        749  
   MAKE YOUR BEST BET  WHAT DO WE ALL KNOW?  My Information  
State  
Number of 
Tickets  
Possible 
Payout  
Number of 
Tickets     State  Count    
A  20 662 10     A  1  |||  
B  3 264  5     B  0     
C  3  264  5     C  0     
D  3  264  5     D  0     
E  20  662  25     E  1  >>>  
F  20 662  10     F  1  |||  
G  3 264 5     G  0     
H  3  264  5     H  0     
I  20  662  25     I  1  >>>  
J  5  371  5     J  0     
   
Total Tickets 
Spent  100  
Total Tickets 
Spent  100           
 
Analysis 
In order to analyze these results we first calculate an omniscient probability 
distribution for each period using every observation that was available to the 
individuals.  This distribution is used as a limit-case benchmark.  That is, only a 
perfect information aggregation mechanism should be able to achieve this 
distribution.  We compare the resultant probabilities from information aggregation 
mechanisms to this benchmark by using the Kullback-Leibler measure [17].  The 
Kullback-Leibler measure of two probability distributions p and q is given by:  
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where p is the "true" distribution (in our case, the omniscient probability 
distribution). In the case of finite number of discrete states, the above Equation (9) 
can be rewritten as:  
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It can be shown that KL(p,q)=0 if and only if the two distributions being compared, p 
and q, are identical, and that KL(p,q) ≥ 0 for all probability distributions p and q. 
Therefore, the smaller the Kullback-Leibler number, the closer that two probabilities 
are to each other.  Furthermore, the Kullback-Leibler measure of the joint 
distribution of multiple independent events is the sum of the Kullback-Leibler 
measures of the individual events.  Since periods within an experiment were 
independent events, the sum or average (across periods) of Kullback-Leibler 
measures is a good summary statistic for an entire experiment. 
We compare five information aggregation mechanisms to the benchmark 
distributions.  In addition, we also report the Kullback-Leibler measures of the no 
information prediction (uniform distribution over all the possible states) and the best 
(most accurate) individuals predictions.  The no information prediction serves as the 
first baseline to determine if any information is contained in our mechanisms 
predictions.  Further, if a mechanism is really aggregating information, then it should 
be doing at least as well as the best individual.  Therefore, the predictions of the best 
individual in the experiment serve as the second baseline, which helps us to 
determine if information aggregation indeed occurred in the experiments. 
The first two information aggregation mechanisms we evaluate are the market 
prediction and the Chen, Fine, and Huberman [16] mechanism in Equation (2).  We 
calculate the market prediction by using the last traded prices of the assets.  We use 
the last traded prices rather than the current rounds price because sometimes there 
was no trade in a given asset in a given round.  From these prices, we infer a 
probability distribution on the states.  The second aggregation mechanism is the 
original IAM, found in Equation (2).  Recall that this mechanism was designed on the 
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assumption of no public information.  The purpose of its inclusion is to measure the 
performance degradation due to the double-counting issue of inherent to the 
presence of public information. 
The third mechanism is our proposed improvement, referred to as the General Public 
Information Correction (GPIC) mechanism, given by Equation (6).  It uses both 
individuals reports of public information regarding outcomes as well as the 
individuals perceived probabilities of these outcomes.  If this mechanism is working 
as predicted by the theory, it should provide a superior outcome to that of the 
original IAM. 
As an additional benchmark the fourth mechanism, referred to as the Perfect Public 
Info Correction (PPIC), replaces individuals reports of public information with the 
true public information that they have observed.  Obviously, this is not possible in a 
realistic environment, since we do not know the true public information (or, this 
exercise would be pointless).  However, it allows us to validate the behavioral 
assumptions we make in the design of the mechanism.  Our model implicitly 
assumes that individuals aggregate their public and private information by a 
modified version of Bayes rule to arrive at their reports, and we can use this 
benchmark to validate this assumption.  
Lastly, we address the special case in which the experimenter knows that every 
individual receives the same public information.  This fifth mechanism, referred to as 
the Special Public Info Correction mechanism (SPIC), recovers the public information 
by using the reports of only the best two individuals to correct the public information 
bias in all participants reports.  
Results 
We start by reporting not only the result of our public information experiments, but 
those of the original Chen, Fine, and Huberman [16] paper as well (Experiments 1 
through 5 on Tables 1 and 2).  Recall that in these experiments, all information was 
independent and private.  As is shown in Tables 1 and 2, once even a small amount 
of public information is introduced into the system (Experiments 6 through 10), the 
performance of the original IAM decreases dramatically.  In Figure 2 we illustrate the 
double counting issue before the GPIC modification.  In this figure, we plot the 
probability distributions generated by omniscience, the prediction from the original 
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IAM and the available public information from a sample period (Experiment 8, period 
9).  As one can see, using the original IAM results in a false peak at state H, which is 
the state on which public information was available.  In some cases, the double 
counting issue is so severe that the results are worse than that of the no information 
measure (see, for example, Experiments 6, 7 and 8).  Thus, this verifies the 
necessity to derive a method correcting for the biases introduced by public 
information. 
Figure 2: Illustration of the Double Counting Issue  
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In Table 1 we summarizes the relative performance, in terms Kullback-Leibler 
measures, of all of the benchmarks mechanisms enumerated above.  Table 2 reports 
the same results in terms of the percentage relative to the no information Kullback-
Leibler measure (indicating the level of improvement over this benchmark).  Note 
that the amount of aggregate information available in an experiment varied across 
the treatments.  Because the pure KL measure reported in Table 1 is affected by the 
amount of underlying information, the percentage measurement in Table 2 are more 
useful when comparing results across experiments.  
The GPIC mechanism (Equation 6) outperforms the best single individuals guesses 
reports in all five experiments.  It also outperforms the market prediction in four out 
of five experiments.  The GPIC mechanism uses the reports of public information of 
individuals to perform the correction.  As expected, this mechanism recovers enough 
public information to perform well compared to an information market.  However, 
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there is room for improvement compared to the case where the true public 
information is used. 
To understand this inefficiency, let us assume that the information aggregator knows 
the true public information seen by every individual and applies the algorithm in 
Equation (8).  The accuracy of the results obtained (Perfect Public Info Correction, or 
PPIC) are almost as good as the performance of the original IAM mechanism in the 
private information case (Experiments 1 through 5).  Furthermore, this method 
outperforms any other method by a large margin.  Although this is not an 
implementable mechanism, since no one knows the true public information, it does 
show the correctness of our behavioral model as to how people mix private and 
public information is correct.  Therefore, there is validity in our approach to teasing 
out this public information in the GPIC. 
Figure 3 illustrates the efficacy of the GPIC.  In this figure, once again, the results 
from Experiment 8, period 9 are plotted.  The GPIC mechanism eliminates the false 
peak shown in Figure 2.  However, the correction is not perfect.  There is still some 
residual positive probability being placed on state H, the site of the false peak.  
When the PPIC is used to perform the correction, the false peak is completely 
eliminated.  
Figure 3: Information Aggregation with Public Information Correction 
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It is important to realize that while algorithms that explicitly aggregate private and 
public information are sensitive to the underlying information structures, markets are 
not.  In all the experiments, including the ones with only private information, the 
performance of the market, measured as a percentage of the no information KL, is 
fairly consistent, albeit somewhat inaccurate.  
 
It is interesting to note that if we assume that every individual receives the same public 
information, we may not need to use everyone’s report to recover public information, as 
described in the SPIC mechanism By searching for pairs with the best performance, 
we can achieve improvements over our GPIC.  However, these pairs were found ex 
post.  That is, we calculate the performance for every pair and then choose the best.  
So, this extension shows merely the possibility of using pairs (or larger subgroups) 
to recover public information.  Simple intuitive ad hoc rules, such as choosing the 
pairs that are closest together in the KL sense, can find good pairs in some 
experiments.  We include the results from such an attempt in Tables 1 and 2 as the 
Special Public Information Correction, or SPIC.  The issue of identifying subgroups to 
recover either public, or for that matter, private information is subject of future 
research. 
Conclusion and Extensions 
Accurate predictions are essential to individuals and organizations, and are quickly 
becoming a key differentiator in todays economy.  For large communities, 
information relevant to forecasts is often dispersed across people, frequently in 
different geographical areas.  Our methodology addresses the needs for an 
implementable mechanism to aggregate this information accurately and with the 
correct incentives.  One can take past predictive performance of participants in 
information markets and create weighting schemes that will help predict future 
events, even if they are not the same event on which the performance was 
measured.  Furthermore, our two-stage approach can improve upon predictions by 
harnessing distributed knowledge in a manner that alleviates problems with low 
levels of participation.  It also mitigates the issues of redundant, public signals in a 
group.  
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The rapid advances of information technologies and the understanding of information 
economics have opened up many new possibilities for applying mechanism design to 
gather and analyze information.  This paper discusses one such design and provides 
empirical evidence about its validity.  
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Table 1: Kullback-Leibler Numbers, by Experiment 
 Experimental Structure Kullback-Liebler Values (Standard Deviation) 
Expt Number of 
Players 
Private 
Info 
Public Info  No Info Market 
Prediction
Best 
Player 
Original 
IAM 
General 
Public Info 
Correction 
Perfect 
Public Info 
Correction 
Special 
Public Info 
Correction 
1 13 3 draws 
for all 
None 1.977 
(0.312) 
1.222  
(0.650) 
0.844 
(0.599) 
0.553  
(1.057) 
N/A N/A N/A 
2 9 3 draws 
for all 
None 1.501 
(0.618) 
1.112  
(0.594) 
1.128 
(0.389) 
0.214  
(0.195) 
N/A N/A N/A 
3 11 ½: 5 
draws ½: 
1 draw 
None 1.689 
(0.576) 
1.053  
(1.083) 
0.876 
(0.646) 
0.414  
(0.404) 
N/A N/A N/A 
4 8 ½: 5 
draws ½: 
1 draw 
None 1.635 
(0.570) 
1.136  
(0.193) 
1.074 
(0.462) 
0.413  
(0.260) 
N/A N/A N/A 
5 10 ½: 3 
draws ½: 
varied 
draws  
None 1.640 
(0.598) 
1.371  
(0.661) 
1.164 
(0.944) 
0.395  
(0.407) 
N/A N/A N/A 
6 10 2 draws 
for all 
2 draws for 
all 
1.332 
(0.595) 
0.847  
(0.312) 
0.932 
(0.566) 
2.095  
(.196) 
0.825  
(0.549) 
0.279  
(0.254) 
0.327 
(0.247) 
7 9 2 draws 
for all 
2 draws for 
all 
1.420 
(0.424) 
0.979  
(0.573) 
0.919 
(0.481) 
2.911  
(2.776) 
0.798  
(0.532) 
0.258  
(0.212) 
0.463 
(0.492) 
8 11 3 draws 
for all 
1 draws for 
all 
1.668 
(0.554) 
1.349  
(0.348) 
1.033 
(0.612) 
2.531  
(1.920) 
0.718  
(0.817) 
0.366  
(0.455) 
0.669 
(0.682) 
9 10 3 draws 
for all 
½: 1 draw 1.596 
(0.603) 
0.851  
(0.324) 
1.072 
(0.604) 
0.951  
(1.049) 
0.798  
(0.580) 
0.704  
(0.691)  
0.793 
(0.706) 
10 10 3 draws 
for all 
1 draws for 
all 
2 sets of 
public info
1.528 
(0.600) 
0.798  
(0.451) 
 1.174 
(0.652) 
0.886  
(0.763) 
1.015  
(0.751) 
0.472  
(0.397) 
0.770 
(0.638) 
 
 
Table 2: Percentage of No-Info Kullback-Leibler Numbers, by Experiment 
 Experimental Structure Kullback-Liebler Values, as a Percent of the No Info Case 
Expt Number of 
Players 
Private 
Info 
Public Info No Info Market 
Prediction 
Best 
Player
Original 
IAM 
General 
Public Info 
Correction 
Perfect 
Public Info 
Correction
Special 
Public Info 
Correction 
1 13 3 draws 
for all 
None 100% 61.8% 42.7% 28.0% N/A N/A N/A 
2 9 3 draws 
for all 
None 100% 74.1% 75.2% 14.3% N/A N/A N/A 
3 11 ½: 5 
draws ½: 
1 draw 
None 100% 62.3% 51.9% 24.5% N/A N/A N/A 
4 8 ½: 5 
draws ½: 
1 draw 
None 100% 69.5% 65.7% 25.3% N/A N/A N/A 
5 10 ½: 3 
draws ½: 
varied 
draws 
None 100% 83.6% 71.0% 24.1% N/A N/A N/A 
6 10 2 draws 
for all 
2 draws for 
all 
100% 63.6% 70.0% 157.3% 61.94% 20.94% 24.53% 
7 9 2 draws 
for all 
2 draws for 
all 
100% 69.0% 64.7% 205.0% 56.2% 18.2% 32.6% 
8 11 3 draws 1 draws for 100% 80.9% 61.9% 151.7% 43.0% 22.0% 40.1% 
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for all all 
9 10 3 draws 
for all 
½: 1 draw 100% 53.3% 67.1% 59.6% 50.0% 44.1% 49.7% 
10 10 3 draws 
for all 
1 draws for 
all 
2 sets of 
public info 
100% 52.2% 76.9% 57.9% 66.4% 30.9% 50.4% 
 
 
Table 3: Excerpt from Payoff Chart used in the MYBB Game 
Number of Tickets Possible Payoff in 
MYBB Game 
Possible Payoff in 
AK Game 
 Number of Tickets Possible Payoff in 
MYBB Game 
Possible Payoff in 
AK Game 
1 33 -1244  50 854 1515 
10 516 388  60 893 1642 
20 662 873  70 925 1750 
30 747 1157  80 953 1844 
40 808 1359  90 978 1926 
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Appendix I 
 
 
Consider the following scenario: 
 
• N possible states of the world 
• M players indexed by i=1…M 
• Player i is given information about the state of the world x { }N,...,2,1∈  
o His beliefs as to the probabilities of the states of the world conditioned 
on his information are Pix  
o Some of player is information is observed by at least one other player 
j. Let Qix be the probability conditioned on is public information only 
(does not consider his private information). 
• Each player i is asked to report two probability distributions pi={pi1,pi2,…piN} 
and qi ={qi1,qi2,…qiN} with the constraints ∑
=
=
N
s
isp
1
1 and ∑
=
=
N
s
isq
1
1  
• The true state x is revealed and he is paid f(pi,qi,q-i|x). 
 
Assumptions: 
 
a) Players are risk neutral utility maximizers, and  
b) f(pi,qi,q-i|x) = c1+c2log(pix)+H(g(qi,qj),log(qjx)) 
c) g:qxq->ℜ  is any real function of two probability distribution such that 
y= ),( yxgMax
x
     
d) H(x,y) is increasing both in x and y 
e) j is determined by: j = 
{ }Mk ...1
maxarg
∈
 g(qi,qk)   
 
Lemma 1: {pi=Pi, qi=Qi for all i}
2 is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. That is, each player 
will report his true conditional probability beliefs and the beliefs conditioned solely on 
his public information.  
 
Proof: 
 
Assuming all players but i are playing an equilibrium strategy, player is 
maximization problem is  
 
{ } { }∑
=
++
N
s
isqp
PMax
ii 1
isiiis21 ))log(Q),Q,H(g(q)log(pcc  s.t. ∑
=
=
N
s
isp
1
1 and ∑
=
=
N
s
isq
1
1 .  
 
There will be at least one other player j that plays qj=Qix since at least one player 
other than i observes the same public information and arrives at the same 
distribution Qi. 
 
The resultant Langrangian is  
 
                                                 
2 Notice that pi and qi are probability distributions. Therefore, the statement is equivalent to 
{pix=Pix for all i,x ; qix=Qix for all i,x}. 
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111
isiiis21 11))log(Q),Q,H(g(q)log(pcc µλ  
 
The first order condition is λ=
is
is
p
P
for all i   => isis pP λ=  
 
Summing over both sides, we get 1=λ . Thus pis=Pis for all i. 
 
Recalling assumption (c), qi=Qi maximizes g(qi,Qi). Since H is increasing in g, it 
also maximizes H(g(qi,qj),log(qjx)). QED. 
 
 
Lemma 2:  There are multiple equilibria to this game. 
The same proof applies to {pi=Pi for all i; qix= N
1
 for all i,x} or for that matter, 
any set of qi on which players coordinate. 
 
